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8	IN THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT		
9	IN THE MATTER OF:	R-20-0031	
10	PETITION TO AMEND THE		
11	ARIZONA RULES OF CRIMINAL	ARIZONA VOICE FOR CRIME VICTIMS'S REPLY TO	
12	PROCEDURE	COMMENTS TO PETITION TO AMEND THE ARIZONA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE	
13		OF CRIMINAL FROCEDURE	
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16	Pursuant to Rule 28(e)(5) of the Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court		
17	Arizona Voice for Crime Victims (AVCV) respectfully submits this Reply ¹ to the		
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19	Comments filed in response to its <i>Petition to Amend the Arizona Rules of Criminal</i>		
20	Procedure.		
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24	Rule 28(e)(5) does not impose a page limit on a Reply to a Comment. This is not addressed in		
25	the editor's notes. AVCV presumes the lack of a page limit is to allow Petitioners to fully respond to all Comments in one Reply. Thus, AVCV is submitting one thirty-four-page Reply to address all four Comments to R-20-0031. If this Court prefers a separate Reply to each Comment, AVCV will follow the direction of this Court.		
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I. <u>COMMENT</u> OF THE ARIZONA PROSECUTING

ATTORNEYS' ADVISORY COUNCIL

The Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council (APAAC) filed a Comment, *Comment of the Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council*, generally in support of AVCV's Petition. APAAC supports full integration of victims' rights into the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Arizona Prosecuting Attorneys' Advisory Council ("APAAC") has again considered the AVCV petition and its proposed changes and supports them. Integrating victims' rights into the various criminal rules will have a significant impact on how the rights of crime victims are ensured and protected in our criminal justice system. At the same time, not repealing Rule 39 will enhance continued understanding and knowledge of victims' rights throughout the criminal justice system.

(APAAC Comment, at pages 1-2.)

AVCV is grateful for APAAC's support and for recognizing that integration will further protect victims' rights.

APAAC has suggested clarifications to a few of AVCV's proposed amendments. AVCV always welcomes feedback and suggestions as it relates to ensuring victims have a meaningful way to exercise their constitutional rights. However, AVCV does not agree that clarification is necessary. Each suggestion is addressed below:

A. Addition of "crime victim" and "victim's attorney" to Rules 1.3, 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9

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AVCV proposes amendments to Rules 1.3, 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9 to include crime victims and victims attorneys in the most basic criminal procedure. Those Rules, as currently written, do not contemplate the involvement of crime victims and their attorneys. Current interpretation has led, in some instances, to a denial of victims' constitutional right to due process, the right to be heard, and impedes the effectiveness of victims' private counsel.

Rule 1.3. Computation of Time

- (a) General Time Computation. When computing any time period more than 24 hours prescribed by these rules, by court order, or by an applicable statute, the following rules apply:
- (5) Additional Time After Service. If a party or crime victim may or must act within a specified time after service and service is made under a method authorized by Rule 1.7(c)(2)(C), (D), or (E), 5 calendar days are added after the specified time period would otherwise expire under (a)(1)-(4), except as provided in Rule 31.3(d). This provision does not apply to the clerk's distribution of notices, minute entries, or other court-generated documents.

Rule 1.7. Filing and Service of Documents

- (c) Service of All Documents Required; Manner of Service. Every person filing a document with any court must serve a copy of the document on all other parties and to any victim's attorney as follows:
- (1) Serving an Attorney. If a party or victim is represented by an attorney, service under this rule must be made on the attorney unless the court orders service on the party.
- (3) Certificate of Service. The date and manner of service must be noted on the last page of the original of the served document or in a separate certificate, in a form substantially as follows:

A copy has been or will be mailed/emailed/hand-delivered [select one] on [insert date] to:

[Name of opposing party or attorney] [Address of opposing party or attorney]

[Name of victim's attorney] [Address of victim's attorney]

If the precise manner in which service has actually been made is not noted, it will be presumed that the document was served by mail. This presumption will only apply if service in some form has actually been made.

Rule 1.8. Clerk's Distribution of Minute Entries and Other Documents

- (a) Generally. The clerk must distribute, either by U.S. mail, electronic mail, or attorney drop box, copies of every minute entry to all parties and to any victim's attorney.
- **(b) Electronic Distribution.** The clerk may distribute minute entries, notices and other court-generated documents to a party or a party's <u>or victim's</u> attorney by electronic means. Electronic distribution of a document is complete when the clerk transmits it to the email address that the party or attorney has provided to the clerk.

Rule 1.9. Motions, Oral Argument, and Proposed Orders

. . .

(b) Service of Motion; Response; Reply. The moving party must serve the motion on all other parties. No later than 10 days after service, another party may file and serve a response, and, no later than 3 days after service of a response, the moving party may file and serve a reply. A reply must be directed only to matters raised in a response. If no response is filed, the court may deem the motion submitted on the record. When addressing matters that impact any victims' rights, a victim may file motions, responses, and replies that comply with these rules.

. . .

(f) Proposed Orders. A proposed order must be prepared as a separate document and may not be included as part of a motion, stipulation, or other document. There must be at least two lines of text on the signature page of a proposed order. A party <u>or victim's attorney</u> must serve the proposed order on the court and all other parties <u>and victim's attorney</u>. A party <u>or victim's attorney</u> must not file a proposed order, and the court will not docket it, until a judge has

reviewed and signed it. Absent a notice of filing, proposed orders will not be part of the record.

APAAC states its concerns here as follows:

To address previous concerns that these modifications elevate victims to "party" status, AVCV has proposed a new Rule 1.2(a)(3) to clarify that the suggested modifications should not be construed to make victims parties to a criminal case. (*See also* Petition, p. 6). While this clarification is useful, it should be stressed that a victim's active participation in making motions and requesting orders in the criminal process is limited to matters that directly involve the victim enforcing a right or challenging the denial of a right. A.R.S. § 13-4437(A); *State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla*, 238 Ariz. 560, ¶ 22 (App. 2015).

(Comment, at page 4.)

AVCV does not dispute APAAC's view but suggests the proposed amendments, as well as existing law, already make it clear that victims are not parties but simply participants with rights. AVCV's proposed Rule 1.2(a)(3) reads: "(3) *Victims Are Not Parties*. These rules are not to be construed to make victims parties to a criminal case."

B. Rule 15.1(g)(1)

AVCV proposes amending the introduction to Rule 15.1(g)(1) to read:

(g) Disclosure by Court Order.

(1) *Disclosure Order*. On the defendant's motion, a court may order any person <u>other than the victim</u> to make available to the defendant material or information not included in this rule if the court finds: . . .

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APAAC suggests that the language be modified to state: "other than the victim, absent a determination by the court that the evidence would be exculpatory." (Comment, at page 5.)

The modification proposed by APAAC is contrary to current law. The government, not victims, has disclosure obligations under *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Absent very limited cases involving due process rights, criminal defendants have no federal or state constitutional right to receive discovery from an unwilling victim. A criminal defendant has no general due process right to discovery apart from the government's obligation to turn over exculpatory information. Brady v. Maryland, supra; Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). Additionally, there is existing Arizona authority that sets the standard that a criminal defendant has to show before a victim's constitutional right to refuse a discovery request yields to the defendant's due process right. See State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232 (App. 1992); State v. Connor, 215 Ariz. 553 (App. 2007); State v. Kellywood, 246 Ariz. 45 (App. 2018); R.S.; S.E. v. Hon. Thompson, 247 Ariz. 575 (App. 2019).

C. Rule 16.3(d)(2)

AVCV proposes amending Rule 16.3(d)(2) to read:

(d) **Scope of Proceeding.** At the conference, the court may:

. . .

(2) set additional pretrial conferences and evidentiary hearings as appropriate <u>after considering the rights and views of the victim, the victim's right to a speedy trial, and the victim's right to be present at all proceedings; . . .</u>

APAAC requests clarification to this proposed amendment:

Rule 16.3 allows the court to set evidentiary hearings and pretrial conferences. AVCV also proposes, as it did in previous petitions, to limit a court's ability to set evidentiary hearings and pretrial conferences unless "the rights and views of the victim, the victim's right to a speedy trial, and the victim's right to be present at all proceedings" have been considered. Proposed Rule 16.3(d)(2). The court's ability to set evidentiary hearings and pretrial conferences, which are generally ministerial and determined by a court's docket, should not be hampered by the addition of the proposed language. Instead, APAAC suggests that if a change to Rule 16.3(d) is necessary to protect victims' rights, the proposed modification should be clarified to apply only to motions to continue these hearings, as provided in A.R.S. § 13-4435(F).

(Comment, at pages 5-6.)

AVCV's proposed language merely sets forth rights victims already have, in a location in the Rules where the importance of those rights is especially significant. Victims have the right to have courts take their rights and views into account throughout the criminal justice process (A.R.S. § 13-4402(A)); victims have the right to a speedy trial (Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(10)); and victims have the right to be present at all proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present (Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(3)).

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Criminal cases often involve a large number of pretrial conferences as it is. Undue delay of trial is often the worst thing the judicial system puts the victim through and leads to secondary victimization. The impact of delays in the justice system is traumatic to victims. It is well-recognized that the intense emotional toll that victims of violent crime experience is often compounded by a difficult experience with the criminal justice system. Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal Justice Involvement on Victims' Mental Health, 23 J. Traum. Stress at 182-83; Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal Intervention, 16 J. Traum. Stress 159 (2003). Secondary victimization sometimes causes even more harm than the initial criminal act. Uli Orth, Secondary Victimization of Crime Victims by Criminal Proceedings, 15 Soc. Just. Res. 313, 321 (2002). Indeed, a victim's experience with the justice system often "means the difference between a healing experience and one that exacerbates the initial trauma." Parsons & Bergin at 182. Mitigation of unreasonable delay in getting to trial is of paramount importance to victims. The proposed amendment simply requires that the court consider the rights and views of the victim, especially the victim's right to a speedy trial, and the victim's right to be present at all proceedings. It is in a Rule such as Rule 16.3 that this language may do victims the most good.

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A.R.S. § 13-4435(F), mentioned by APAAC, is intended to serve the same purpose as the proposed addition to Rule 16.3(d)(2), but in a different context, namely, when a motion for continuance is actually made.

Rule 16.4(a)

AVCV proposes amending Rule 16.4(a) to read:

Rule 16.4. Dismissal of Prosecution

(a) On the State's Motion. On the State's motion and for good cause, the court, <u>after considering the views of the victim</u>, may order a prosecution dismissed without prejudice if it finds that the dismissal is not to avoid Rule 8 time limits.

APAAC requests clarification to this proposed amendment:

This proposed language inserts the victim into the State's decision to dismiss a prosecution and the court's ability to grant it. Fairly read, this proposal could give a victim the right to object to a dismissal by the State. This is not something that currently exists in the VBR or its implementing statutes.

APAAC has previously pointed out that a victim has the right, upon request, to confer with the prosecution about a dismissal (A.R.S. § 13-4419(A)), but that right does not extend to having the court deny a dismissal if the victim objects. A prosecuting attorney must be free to decide which cases to pursue or not, and the case law is clear that a prosecutor has broad discretion to prosecute cases "regardless of the wishes of the victim." . . . A victim has no authority to direct the prosecution of a case. A.R.S. § 13-4419(C). APAAC recommends that if the proposed modification is to be adopted, it should be amended to read "after determining that the victim has conferred with the prosecutor."

(Comment, at pages 6-7.)

AVCV agrees that A.R.S. § 13-4419(C) makes it clear that "A victim has no authority to direct the prosecution of a case." AVCV is simply seeking consistency

between the Rules and the constitutional mandate that requires "...rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of evidence in all criminal proceedings protect victims' rights..." Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(11). AVCV's proposed language does not interfere with prosecutorial discretion. In a situation where a prosecutor is seeking to dismiss the case, the view of the victims can be communicated through the prosecutor.

AVCV agrees that A.R.S. § 13-4419(A) gives the victim the right, upon request, to confer with the prosecution about a dismissal. It is especially important for a court to know the views of the victim and to consider the victims' constitutional rights to justice and due process, under Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A), and to include in their analysis as required by Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(11), if it is called upon by the state to dismiss a case, even if the dismissal is without prejudice, given the unlikelihood that a case, once dismissed at the instance of the state, will ever be re-filed.

APAAC asserts that the right here contended for is not something that currently exists in the VBR or its implementing statutes. However, A.R.S. 13-4418 requires a liberal construction. The VBR was enacted "To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process." Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A). The first VBR right is the right "To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity . . . throughout the criminal justice process." Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(1). The

VBR also includes the right "To be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision," which would necessarily involve, in the case of an in-custody defendant, a decision to dismiss the prosecution. Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(4). The VBR also includes the right "To have all rules governing criminal procedure . . protect victims' rights." If the state moves to dismiss a prosecution, giving the victim the right to make his or her views known to the court before the court acts is consistent with victims' rights under the VBR.

II. COUNTY MARICOPA ATTORNEY'S COMMENT **SUPPORT**

The Maricopa County Attorney's Comment completely supports AVCV's Petition:

As currently drafted, victims' rights are consolidated into one rule at the end of the criminal rules. Given this, victims' rights can be easily and inadvertently overlooked when practitioners or courts refer to individual rules of procedure for guidance. Petitioner has cited several instances where the placement of the rules likely contributed to a court's failure to enforce these rights.

Victims' rights are so important in Arizona that they are protected in the Arizona Constitution. Their importance should likewise be reflected within the individual rules of criminal procedure along with the rights of the parties. Hopefully the integration of these rights within the rules will achieve that necessary equality.

(Comment, at pages 1-2.)

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AVCV thanks the Maricopa County Attorney, Allister Adel, for her unqualified support and for recognizing the need to have victims' rights fully integrated throughout the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

III. <u>COMMENT OF ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL</u> <u>JUSTICE AND MARICOPA COUNTY OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC</u> <u>DEFENDER</u>

The Comment of Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice and Maricopa County Office of the Public Defender Regarding Petition to Amend the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure by Repealing Rule 39 opposes AVCV's Petition. The criminal defense bar resisted the changes in criminal law brought about by the victims' rights movement, including its constitutional reform in Arizona. The resistance continues through the objections lodged by the Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice (AACJ) and the Maricopa County Public Defender (MCPD) to AVCV's 2020 Petition.

The lack of candor and understanding of the Comment itself is indicated in its very title. AVCV's current Petition does not seek to *repeal* Rule 39, but to *maintain* it. The decision to maintain Rule 39 in AVCV's current Petition is a decision that was made after considering the views of criminal justice stakeholders, including the views of AACJ/MCPD. The error in the title is carried over into the Comment itself, which states that "AACJ and MCPD oppose the Petition of

Arizona Voice for Crime Victims (AVCV) to repeal Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 39 and instead 'integrate' that Rule's protections across the rules . . ." (Comment, at page 2.) A careful reading of AVCV's current Petition would allow the reader to see the changes in this Petition over previous Petitions, each of which, No. R-18-0001 and R-19-0016, *did* call for the *repeal* of Rule 39. AVCV's 2020 Petition specifically explains that this year's approach is different:

AVCV has previously petitioned this Court to repeal Rule 39 after full integration of victims' rights into the rules. After considering stakeholder concerns over repealing Rule 39, this petition does not propose a repeal of Rule 39. However, AVCV proposes one amendment to Rule 39(a) in the event a future conflict arises between a rule and a provision of Rule 39. AVCV proposes adding subsection (3)(C) that states: "If any provision of Rule 39 conflicts with a rule provision where a victim's right is addressed, the individual rule provision where the victim's rights has been integrated shall prevail."

(Petition, at page 3.)

AACJ/MCPD explains their opposition to AVCV's Petition, reasoning that "the result would be a counter-productive scattering of [the] protections [afforded victims by Rule 39]. Although AVCV believes that this will assist trial judges in locating relevant protections for victims, this change would actually make it more challenging for judges to do so." (*Id.*)

Integrating victims' rights into the very Rules in which they are implicated is contrary to scattering. We cannot contemplate how integration of victims' rights would make it challenging for judges and criminal justice practitioners to locate

the relevant protections for victims. In addition to ensuring victims' rights are protected, integration serves another purpose and that is the ease of practice. When addressing a specific event in a criminal case, judges and practitioners will only have to consult only the Rule governing that event, rather than having to flip around in the Rules to try to find other Rules, such as Rule 39, that may relate to that event without understanding the application of Rule 39 to the more specific provision.

AACJ/MCPD also asserts that AVCV is proposing substantive changes: "Moreover, although AVCV urges that these changes are merely stylistic to assist parties and judges, there are also several substantive changes." (Comment, at pages 2-3.). AVCV's proposed amendments are not substantive, nor should they be characterized that way. AVCV is simply integrating victims' rights by proposing amendments to Rules governing procedural events that implicate victims' rights. AVCV's proposed amendments would not work a change in the underlying law on which the Rule change relies—the Rule change would not *expand* the victims' right in question, but only place it where it could more easily be found. Ultimately, the proposed amendments will guide judges and practitioners on the application of victims' rights.

AACJ/MCPD note some additional objections as outlined below:

(1) "Most concerning is Petitioner's failure not only to acknowledge that this is the third consecutive year AVCV has filed a virtually identical petition, but also to make any significant changes to account for potential reasons why this Court has rejected both Previous attempts at this proposal." (Comment, at page 3.)

(2) Petitioner's counsel did not "acknowledge" that she attended meetings of the Task Force of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rule 32 Task Force, which turned down proposals made at those meetings. (*Id.*)

The Petition acknowledges this is not AVCV's first rule change Petition in the first full paragraph on the third page. Additionally, the Petition addresses that changes in this year's Petition are a result of stakeholder concerns. Further, Rule 28 does not prohibit a Petition being re-filed in subsequent years. Each of AVCV's rule change Petitions have included modifications after considering stakeholder concerns. AACJ/MCPD's concerns are misplaced and attempt to deflect from the merits of AVCV's Petition.

With respect to the second point they make, it is irrelevant to the issues presented by the instant Petition. AACJ/MCPD asserts: "Petitioner's counsel [] repeatedly attended public meetings of both [Task Forces] to propose *this idea* during the public comment period, and at every meeting where *the issue* was raised, both Task Forces resoundingly rejected *the idea* both through comments by their members and through lack of a motion of any member to make this change."

However, they fail to mention that the 2017 Task Force advised that changes AVCV was seeking should be in their own rule change Petition.

Without noting any particular proposed amendment in AVCV's current Petition, AACJ/MCPD has attached their Comments to AVCV's 2018 and 2019 Petitions. AACJ/MCPD state:

AACJ and MCPD have substantively responded to AVCV's previous two petitions. Because AVCV has made no attempt to address the issues raised through previous petitions but has instead rehashed essentially the same petition, AACJ and MCPD will not rehash their comments to those petitions; instead those comments are attached hereto as Appendix A (2018 comment) and Appendix B (2019 comment) and the arguments therein are incorporated by reference.

(Comment, at page 3.)

AVCV's previous Petitions are significantly different than the Petition currently pending before this Court. AVCV made changes in 2020 based on the 2018 and 2019 Comments of AACJ/MCPD (or its predecessor, Arizona Public Defender's Association (APDA)) to AVCV's 2018 and 2019 Petitions. AACJMCPD have mischaracterized the 2020 Petition as a "rehash."

Of the only six amendments AACJ/MCPD objected to in the 2018 Petition, four were changed by AVCV already in its 2019 Petition, in part in response to objections raised by AACP/ADPA in their 2018 Comment, and those changes remain the same in the 2020 Petition. Following those changes, in their 2019

Comment, AACJ/MCPD dropped two of their objections. AACJ/MCPD did not acknowledge these changes in their Comment to AVCV's current Petition. With respect to the Comments made by AACJ/MCPD/APDA in connection with AVCV's 2018 and 2019 Petitions, to the extent those Comments are relevant to specific amendments sought by AVCV's 2020 Petition AVCV responds as follows:

A. Appendix A: 2018 Comment—AVCV Petition No. R-18-0001

The 2018 Comment was filed by AACJ and APDA. It identified *only six proposed Rule changes* that, according to the Comment, "highlight[] just some of the proposed changes in the Petition that go beyond the scope of stylistic integration, creating 'new victims' rights' and limiting the due process rights of the accused." (Comment, at page 4.) These six changes were, however, the only changes specifically addressed by AACJ/MCPD/APDA in their 2018 and 2019 Comments.

These six proposed 2018 Rule changes are considered below relative to AVCV's 2019 and 2020 Petitions:

1. <u>Rule 1.9</u>

AVCV's proposed 2018 changes to Rule 1.9 read as follows:

Rule 1.9. Motions, Oral Argument, and Proposed Orders

(f) Service of Motion; Response; Reply. The moving party or the victim's attorney must serve the motion on all other parties. No

later than 10 days after service, another party or the victim's attorney may file and serve a response, and, no later than 3 days after service of a response, the moving party or the victim's attorney may file and serve a reply. A reply must be directed only to matters raised in a response. If no response is filed, the court may deem the motion submitted on the record.

. .

- (h) Waiver of Requirements. On a party's <u>or victim's attorney's</u> request or on its own, the court may waive a requirement specified in this rule, or it may overlook a formal defect in a motion.
- (i) Oral Argument. On a party's <u>or victim's attorney's</u> request or on its own, the court may set a motion for argument or hearing.
- (j) Proposed Orders. A proposed order must be prepared as a separate document and may not be included as part of a motion, stipulation, or other document. There must be at least two lines of text on the signature page of a proposed order. A party or victim's attorney must serve the proposed order on the court and all other parties and victim's attorney. A party or victim's attorney must not file a proposed order, and the court will not docket it, until a judge has reviewed and signed it. Absent a notice of filing, proposed orders will not be part of the record.

The 2018 Comment objected to these changes as follows:

The proposed change to Rule 1.9 explicitly grants the victim's attorney new rights, including the right to file motions, ask for arguments and hearings, and propose court orders. Seemingly, this right would not be afforded to victims not represented by counsel, but only to attorneys of victims, such as the attorneys at the Arizona Voice for Criminal Victims.

(2018 Comment, at page 4.)

In AVCV's 2019 Petition, AVCV revised the changes sought in Rule 1.9 to read as follows:

Rule 1.9. Motions, Oral Argument, and Proposed Orders

. . .

(b) Service of Motion; Response; Reply. The moving party must serve the motion on all other parties. No later than 10 days after service, another party may file and serve a response, and, no later than 3 days after service of a response, the moving party may file and serve a reply. A reply must be directed only to matters raised in a response. If no response is filed, the court may deem the motion submitted on the record. When addressing matters that impact any victim's rights, a victim may file motions, responses, and replies that comply with these rules.

- (d) Waiver of Requirements. On a party's request or on its own, The court may waive a requirement specified in this rule, or it may overlook a formal defect in a motion.
- (e) Oral Argument. On a party's request or on its own, The court may set a motion for argument or hearing.
- (f) Proposed Orders. A proposed order must be prepared as a separate document and may not be included as part of a motion, stipulation, or other document. There must be at least two lines of text on the signature page of a proposed order. A party or victim's attorney must serve the proposed order on the court and all other parties and victim's attorney. A party or victim's attorney must not file a proposed order, and the court will not docket it, until a judge has reviewed and signed it. Absent a notice of filing, proposed orders will not be part of the record.

The changes sought by AVCV to Rule 1.9 in its 2019 Petition remain the same in AVCV's 2020 Petition.

AVCV's proposed 2019 and 2020 amendments to Rule 1.9 are different than AVCV's proposed 2018 amendments. The 2019 and 2020 amendments to Rule 1.9(b) eliminate the phrases, "or the victim's attorney," and merely propose to add the following sentence at the end of the subsection: "When addressing matters that impact any victims' rights, a victim may file motions, responses, and replies that comply with these rules." That addresses the concern raised by AACJ/APDA in

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their 2018 Comment. The 2019 and 2020 amendments to Rule 1.9(d) and (e) also differ in that they also eliminate the phrases, "or the victim's attorney." Only the proposed 2018 amendment to Rule 1.9(f) remains the same in the proposed 2019 and 2020 amendments.

None of the proposed amendments to Rule 1.9 by the 2018, 2019, or 2020 Petitions would create any new rights for victims or make victims "quasi-part[ies], equal with the defendant and the state throughout the entire criminal process," as the 2018 Comment charged. The Comment completely overlooks that A.R.S. § 13-4437(A) conferred standing on victims "to seek an order, to bring a special action or to file a notice of appearance in a trial court or an appellate proceeding, seeking to enforce any right or to challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims." The sentence AVCV added to the end of Rule 1.9(b) in its 2019 and 2020 Petitions--"When addressing matters that impact any victims' rights, a victim may file motions, responses, and replies that comply with these rules"--simply recognizes the rights already established by the state constitution and statutes which give victims standing to assert their rights.

The changes proposed in all three Petitions for Ru1e 1.9(f) are simply intended to ensure that in addition to parties, victims, through their attorneys, will be able to serve and receive proposed orders in connection with motion practice relevant to victims and their rights.

AACJ/APDA objection to AVCV's 2018 proposed changes to Rule 1.9:

The proposed change to Rule 1.9 goes beyond these enumerated rights and obligations, and inserts the victim into the delicate balance between the prosecution and defense in a way not contemplated by the VBR. . . . At its core, the VBR intends to protect and inform the victim. What the Petition seeks, and what the VBR does not intend, is to make victims a qausi-party, equal with the defendant and the state throughout the entire criminal process.

The proposed changes would grant a victim's attorney unprecedented power, but with none of the ethical obligations and responsibilities of the prosecutor. . . . The proposed Rule 1.9 would convert a victim's attorney from a counselor for the victim into a party to the criminal proceeding, making him a sort of adjunct prosecutor, capable of disrupting and influencing pretrial hearings and criminal proceedings. This expansion of power exceeds the victim's right to be informed or treated with dignity and respect while trampling on the province of the prosecutor and the due process rights of the defendant.

. . . To elevate the victim or his attorney to party status in a criminal proceeding violates the most fundamental notions of justice.

(Comment, at pages 8-9.)

AACJ/APDA have misinterpreted the VBR, its implementing statutes and Rules, and the cases decided to date. Victims are no longer just passive spectators at criminal trials, but active participants with certain rights, and with standing to enforce those rights, individually or through counsel of their own choice.

AVCV's 2020 proposed amendment to Rule 1.2, the addition of a subsection (a)(3), which would provide: "Victims Are Not Parties. These rules are not to be construed to make victims parties to a criminal case." AVCV proposed this amendment after considering stakeholder feedback in previous Comments. It is consistent with A.R.S. § 13-4419(C), which makes clear something already

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implicit in the criminal justice system: "The right of the victim to confer with the prosecuting attorney does not include the authority to direct the prosecution of the case."

While AVCV's previous Petitions were not an attempt to make victims parties, AVCV attempted to make that clear in the 2020 Petition by acknowledging the limits on victims' rights that have already been addressed by Arizona's case authority:

It is important to point out that in seeking integration, AVCV is not asserting that victims are parties to a criminal case nor is AVCV seeking to elevate victims to party status. Arizona case authority is clear that victims of crime are not parties to a criminal prosecution. State v. Lamberton, 183 Ariz. 47 (1995) (victim is not an aggrieved party with standing to file her own petition for review in a Rule 32 proceeding); Lindsay R. v. Cohen, 236 Ariz. 565 (App. 2015) (noting VBR did not make victims parties). AVCV proposes an amendment to Rule 1.2(a) to clarify that fully integrating victims' rights throughout the rules of procedure will not make victims parties to a criminal case. AVCV proposes adding subsection (3) to read: "Victims Are Not Parties. These rules are not to be construed to make victims parties to a criminal case." Although victims are not parties, they are important participants with enforceable rights throughout the entirety of Arizona's criminal justice process. AVCV merely seeks to ensure that trial courts and attorneys are aware of each applicable situation where a victim may assert a right guaranteed under the VBR or the VRIA.

(2020 Petition, at page 6.)

2. Rule 6.7

The 2018 Comment objected to AVCV's proposed 2018 change to Rule 6.7(d) because it "cut[] the time given to the defendant in a capital case to move

for an expert witness after the State makes it disclosure under Rule 15.1(i)(3) in half from 60 to 30 days." (Comment, at page 4.)

AVCV made the change requested by AACJ and APDA in AVCV's 2019 Petition, and AVCV's 2020 Petition remains the same, that is, it leaves the time period in Rule 6.7(d) at 60 days.

3. Rule 7.3

AVCV's proposed 2018 changes to Rule 7.3 to which AACJ and APDA objected are the same as AVCV's proposed 2019 and 2020 changes to Rule 7.3. The changes are as follows:

Rule 7.3. Conditions of Release

- (a) Mandatory Conditions. Every order of release must contain the following conditions:
 - (1) the defendant must appear at all court proceedings;
 - (2) the defendant must not commit any criminal offense;
- (3) the defendant must not leave Arizona without the court's permission; and
- (4) the defendant must not contact the victim, unless the court clearly finds good cause to conclude the victim's safety would be protected without a no-contact order; and
- (4) (5) if a defendant is released during an appeal after judgment and sentence, the defendant will diligently pursue the appeal.

. . .

(c) Additional Conditions. The court must order the defendant not to contact a victim if such an order is reasonable and necessary to protect a victim from physical harm, harassment, intimidation, or abuse. The court also may impose as a condition of release one or more of the following conditions, if the court finds the condition is reasonable and necessary to secure the defendant's appearance or to protect another person or the community from risk of harm by the defendant. In making determinations under this rule, the

court must consider, if provided, the results of a risk assessment approved by the Supreme Court and a law enforcement's lethality assessment.

The 2018 Comment objected to these changes on the basis that "The proposed Rule 7.3 establishes an automatic no-contact order with the victim, and it shifts the burden onto the defendant to show 'good cause' to overcome it." (Comment, at page 4.)

The proposed changes to Rule 7.3 are simply the application to Rule 39(b)(1), the right to be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse throughout the criminal justice process. Already existing Rule 39(b)(1) is consistent with the mirroring constitutional provisions, Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(1), and A.R.S. § 13-4431, which provides: "Before, during and immediately after any court proceeding, the court shall provide appropriate safeguards to minimize the contact that occurs between the victim, the victim's immediate family and the victim's witnesses and the defendant, the defendant's immediate family and defense witnesses."

One of the most terrifying things that can happen to a victim after a crime is committed, especially a violent crime, is the release of the defendant. AACJ and APDA voice concern that the proposed changes will "shift[] the burden onto the defendant to show 'good cause' to overcome" a no-contact order. Victims concerns about a defendant's release from custody are legitimate. The VBR

addresses these very real concerns by granting victims a constitutional right to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse throughout the criminal justice process. Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(1) Released defendants generally have no valid reasons for wanting to contact their victims, and if they do have such reasons, the proposed changes allow defendants to advance them.

4. Rule 7.5

AVCV's proposed 2018 change to Rule 7.5 to which AACJ and APDA objected is the same as AVCV's proposed 2019 and 2020 change to Rule 7.3. The change is merely to add the word "abuse" to Rule 7.5(c), as follows:

On Victim's Petition. If the prosecutor decides not to file a petition under (a), the victim may petition the court to revoke the defendant's bond or own recognizance release, or otherwise modify the conditions of the defendant's release. Before filing a petition, the victim must consult with the prosecutor about the requested relief. The petition must include a statement under oath by the victim asserting any harassment, threats, physical violence, <u>abuse</u>, or intimidation by the defendant, or on the defendant's behalf, against the victim or the victim's immediate family.

AACJ and APDA objected to this change on the basis that "The proposed Rule 7.5 widens the scope of reasons a victim can seek to modify a defendant's release conditions." (Comment, at page 4.)

Victims have standing to exercise their constitutional right to be free from intimidation, harassment, or *abuse* by filing a Petition to modify the conditions of the defendant's release if the victim or the victim's immediate family suffers such

"abuse" at the hands of the defendant, or on the defendant's behalf, just as much as if the matter involved was "harassment, threats, physical violence, or intimidation." Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(1). AACJ and APDA have advanced no valid reason to reject the proposed change.

5. Rule 15.6

AVCV's proposed 2018 change to Rule 15.6 to which AACJ and APDA objected was as follows:

Extension of Time for Completion of Testing.

- (1) *Motion*. Before the final disclosure deadline in (c), a party may move to extend the deadline to permit the completion of scientific or other testing. The motion must be supported by an affidavit from a crime laboratory representative or other scientific expert stating that additional time is needed to complete the testing or a report based on the testing. The affidavit must specify how much additional time is needed.
- (2) *Order*. If a motion is filed under (e)(1), the court must grant reasonable time to complete disclosure unless the court finds that the need for the extension resulted from dilatory conduct or neglect, would infringe on the victim's right to a speedy trial asserted by the victim or by the state on behalf of the victim, or that the request is being made for an improper reason by the moving party or a person listed in Rule 15.1(f) or 15.2(f).
- (3) Extending Time. If the court grants a motion under (e)(2), the court may extend other disclosure deadlines as necessary.

The objection by AACJ and APDA was: "The proposed Rule 15.6 places the victim's speedy trial rights above the due process rights of the accused by allowing the judge to ignore the requirement that reasonable time be given to complete discovery." (Comment, at page 4.)

AVCV made the change requested by AACJ/APDA in AVCV's 2019 Petition, and AVCV's proposed 2020 change to Rule 15.6 remains the same as it was in 2019:

(e) Extension of Time for Completion of Testing.

- (1) *Motion*. Before the final disclosure deadline in (c), a party may move to extend the deadline to permit the completion of scientific or other testing. The motion must be supported by an affidavit from a crime laboratory representative or other scientific expert stating that additional time is needed to complete the testing or a report based on the testing. The affidavit must specify how much additional time is needed.
- (2) Order. If a motion is filed under (e)(1), the court must grant reasonable time to complete disclosure unless the court finds that the need for the extension resulted from dilatory conduct or neglect, or that the request is being made for an improper reason by the moving party or a person listed in Rule 15.1(f) or 15.2(f).
- (3) Extending Time. If the court grants a motion under (e)(2), the court may extend other disclosure deadlines as necessary. In determining new deadlines under this rule, the court must consider the victim's and defendant's right to a speedy trial.

The proposed 2019 change, carried over into 2020, answered the 2018 objection. The sentence AACJ and APDA were opposed to in subsection (2) was removed and replaced with a sentence in subsection (3) that referred to both the victim's and the defendant's right to a speedy trial.

6. **Rule 16.3**

AVCV's proposed 2018 change to Rule 15.6 to which AACJ and APDA objected was as follows:

Scope of Proceeding. At the conference, the court, <u>after considering the views of the victim</u>, may:

- (1) hear motions made at or filed before the conference;
- (2) set additional pretrial conferences and evidentiary hearings as appropriate;
 - (3) obtain stipulations to relevant facts; and
- (4) discuss and determine any other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial, including imposing time limits on trial proceedings, using juror notebooks, giving brief pre-voir dire opening statements and preliminary instructions, and managing documents and exhibits effectively during trial.

The objection by AACJ and APDA was: "The proposed Rule 16.3 allows the victim to weigh in before the court hears motions, sets hearings or conferences, accepts stipulations, or does anything else at any of the pretrial hearings." (Comment, at page 4.)

In AVCV's 2019 Petition, AVCV made changes to the amendment it sought in Rule 16.3(d) in part in response to the objection of AACJ/APDA, and AVCV's proposed 2020 changes to Rule 16.3(d) remain the same as they were in 2019:

- (d) **Scope of Proceeding.** At the conference, the court may:
- (1) hear motions made at or filed before the conference;
- (2) set additional pretrial conferences and evidentiary hearings as appropriate <u>after considering the rights and views of the victim, the victim's right to a speedy trial, and the victim's right to be present at all proceedings;</u>
 - (3) obtain stipulations to relevant facts; and
- (4) discuss and determine any other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial, including imposing time limits on trial proceedings, using juror notebooks, giving brief pre-voir dire opening statements and preliminary instructions, and managing documents and exhibits effectively during trial.

The proposed amendments merely recognize that victims have the constitutional rights "To be present at and, upon request, to be informed of all

criminal proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present"; "To be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a negotiated plea, and sentencing"; and "To a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of the case after the conviction and sentence." Ariz. Const. Art. II, § 2.1(A)(3), (4), and (10), respectively.

B. Appendix B: 2019 Comment—AVCV Petition No. R-19-0016

The 2019 Comment was filed by AACJ and MCPD. In their 2019 Comment, AACJ/MCPD acknowledged that AVCV changed Rules 6.7(d) and 15.6(e) to meet the objections in their 2018 Comment and dropped their objections relative to those Rules. That left AACJ/MCPD with only their objections to AVCV's proposed changes to Rules 1.9, 7.3(a) and (c), 7.5(c), and 16.3(d), which have been addressed above.

IV. COMMENT OF THE STATE BAR OF ARIZONA

The *Comment of the State Bar of Arizona* opposes AVCV's Petition. The Bar does not cite any specific proposed amendments, but the general objections are outlined below.

The Bar first asserts: "The Petition seeks to modify a vast majority of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure to insert victim rights into most of the rules, while simultaneously maintaining Rule 39 which contains these rights." (Comment, at page 1.) The Bar relies on *Slayton v. Shumway*, 166 Ariz. 87 (1990),

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to assert that victims' rights must be narrowly construed to deal only with procedural rules pertaining to victims. (Comment, at page 2.)

AVCV's Petition only seeks to modify the Rules by adding references to victims and their rights in Rules where they already are supported by existing law. Reliance on Slayton v. Shumway is misplaced. Slayton simply does not stand for the proposition that victims' rights must be narrowly construed. Slayton involved a challenge to Prop. 104 being on the November 1990 ballot. Slayton, 166 Ariz. at 88. The challenger argued that Prop. 104 violated the single subject rule of the Arizona Constitution. Id. The challenger acknowledged that the provisions now known as Ariz. Const. art. II, §§ 2.1(A)(1)-(10) were so interrelated that they indeed formed a single subject, but argued that the provision now known as Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1(A)(11), which pertains to rule making authority, was not sufficiently related. *Id.* at 88-89. Slayton interpreted that provision to transfer rule making authority from this Court to the state legislature. Id. The Prop 104 Task Force had a narrow view of its own provision, acknowledging that rulemaking authority granted to the legislature is for the limited purpose of protecting victims' rights. *Id.* at 92. In fact, this Court has previously acknowledged that victims' rights are to be "liberally construed to preserve and protect the rights to which victims are entitled." J.D.; M.M. v. Hegyi, 236 Ariz. 39 (2014) citing A.R.S. § 13-4418.

Next, the Bar argues that:

Like the prior petitions, the instant Petition will effectively expand victim rights to procedural rules which neither pertain to nor directly implicate specific rights unique and peculiar to victims created by VBR. As Petitioner states, the goal of the proposed rule changes is to make "all rules governing criminal procedure" protect victim rights to be heard and to participate in criminal proceedings. (Petition at 5). This aim is inconsistent with the narrow construction given victim rights as it seeks to elevate crime victims to the status of party in a criminal proceeding—which crime victims are not. Lindsay R. v. Cohen, 236 Ariz. 565 (App. 2015) (VBR did not make victims parties). Moreover, Petitioner relies on VBR's general aims of affording victims "due process," as well as its requirement that victims be "treated with fairness, dignity and respect," but these are not rights "created by" VBR.

(Comment, at pages 2-3.)

First, AVCV's proposed amendments do not "expand[s] victim rights to procedural rules which neither pertain to nor directly implicate specific rights unique and peculiar to victims created by VBR." In fact, AVCV has not proposed any such amendments. More importantly, the Bar fails to understand that the "unique and peculiar" language has been used by the Supreme Court to refer to the legislature's ability to enact procedural statutes. *State ex rel. Napolitano v. Brown*, 194 Ariz. 340 (Ariz. 1999).

Second, the Bar misquotes AVCV's Petition when it asserts that, "As Petitioner states, the goal of the proposed rule changes is to make 'all rules governing criminal procedure' protect victim rights to be heard and to participate

in criminal proceedings. (Petition at 5)." Rather, AVCV's Petition actually says: "Integrating victims' rights into each applicable rule would be consistent with the right established in paragraph 11 of the VBR, namely that 'all rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of evidence in all criminal proceedings protect victims' rights.' (emphasis added.) Ariz. Const. art. II., § 2.1(A)(11)."

Third, again, victims' rights are not to be given a "narrow construction" as it would be inconsistent with A.R.S. § 13-4418. Additionally, nothing in the proposed amendments seeks to elevate crime victims to the status of party in a criminal proceeding. On the contrary, AVCV proposes and amendment that states, "These rules are not be construed to make victims parties to a criminal case." Rule 1.2(a)(3). And A.R.S. § 13-4419(C) makes it clear that it is the prosecutor who directs the prosecution of a criminal case—something that is clear in the nature of criminal law even in the absence of a statute.

Fourth, the Bar's asserts that the rights of victims to "due process" and to be treated with "fairness, respect, and dignity throughout the criminal justice process" "are not rights 'created by' VBR." Indeed, they are express constitutional rights conferred upon victims in the first clauses of the VBR:

Section 2.1. (A) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and *due process*, a victim of crime has a right:

1. To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation, harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process.

Finally, the Bar asserts:

Rule 39 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth *all* rights afforded crime victims on matters unique and peculiar to them. Of course, trial courts are bound by and must follow the provisions of that rule. Although Petitioner sets forth five cases in which it claims victim rights were violated by the trial court, whether violations actually occurred in the matters described is not established. Even assuming the facts as stated, every victim has "standing to seek an order, [or] to bring a special action...seeking to enforce any right or to challenge an order denying any right guaranteed to victims." *A.R.S.* §13-4437(A).

First, Rule 39 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure does not set forth *all* rights afforded crime victims on matters unique and peculiar to them. The statement does not consider the VBR, its implementing legislation, and other Rules. However, AVCV's Petition is limited to integrating Rule 39 throughout the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Second, the Bar questions the cases, which was not an exhaustive list of cases, that AVCV highlighted. AVCV's Petition provides details of the violations, states that AVCV has copies of the transcripts on file, and that it has additional case examples available upon request of the Court. However, AVCV was limited, as it noted in the Petition, in what it could put into the Petition by the 20-page limit of Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. (a)(4)(B). Further, the fact that A.R.S. § 13-4437(A) gives victims standing to file a special action does not excuse trial courts from properly applying victims' rights. Nor does it mean that victims should endure criminal proceedings without meaningful participation in Arizona's trial courts simply

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because they have an appellate remedy. It is imperative that victims' rights assist victims with the "healing of their ordeals" as this Court directed. *Champlin v. Sargeant*, 192 Ariz. 371 (1999).

CONCLUSION

Of the four Comments received in response to AVCV's 2020 Petition, one is in complete support, one is primarily in support, and two are opposed. The arguments against the Petition made in the two opposed Comments do not justify their oppositions.

AVCV respectfully requests that the Court grant the Petition and adopt all of the amendments it seeks.

Respectfully submitted June 1, 2020. ARIZONA VOICE FOR CRIME VICTIMS

BY: __/s/___ COLLEEN CLASE